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Conditions of Identity. by Andrew Brennan

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because implicit in, the more comprehensive object of which it is aware, e.g. not merely the awareness of one's intending that is implicit in one's awareness that one is about to do one of the things which it is *up to one* either to do or refrain from doing, but also the awareness of one's perceiving which is implicit in one's awareness (whatever the degree of attentiveness or realisation) of the presentedness of that to which one's perceiving refers. Although in some ways faulty, one version of this sort of interpretation, viz. Searle's intentionalism, is sufficiently well-known to deserve the attention it here does not get. Notice that if one's consciousness is implicit in, or intrinsic to, that of which one is more comprehensively conscious of, the major difficulty that besets introspection as traditionally conceived, i.e. how one can attend both to what one is aware of and to one's awareness, no longer arises.

Despite this omission readers in general will value Lyons' book at the very least for its compendious coverage and trenchant criticism of attempts past and present to account for self-awareness as a kind of inner sense. Those who share this reviewer's leanings will likewise admire the provocative grace with which it presents theoretically rather uninteresting parts of the truth about that awareness as if they were the whole.

Andrew Brennan, *Conditions of Identity*, (Oxford U. Press, 1988), pp. 390, \$ 79 (cloth).

GEORGE N. SCHLESINGER

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This is a remarkable work. Brennan's book ranges considerably wider and probes deeper than most other books on the same topic. He presents and examines judiciously a great variety of positions and accords a fair hearing to virtually every view he mentions. The picture emerging gradually includes elements from a variety of sources; ultimately it is original both in style and in content.

The notion of 'survival' is central to the work. A may not be identical with B but may survive as, or in, B. For example, a caterpillar is by no means identical with the butterfly into which it is eventually transformed yet may be said to survive in the latter. Of course, one could also say that A and B are different temporal parts of one and the same four dimensional particular, C. However the notion of 'survival' is much more supple than that of being components of a larger entity. For one thing, A and B either are or are not components of C, whereas A may survive in B to different degrees. It has also a much wider range of application; one may sensibly debate, as some critics have, even such questions, as to whether the mordant pen of Horace survives significantly in Alexander Pope's *Satires*.

Let us have a quick look at two among the great diversity of issues discussed. In Chapter 5 Brennan raises the question whether in general a temporal part of an F-thing is itself an F-thing. Now for example, a small fraction lifted from a Beethoven symphony lacks the essential features of a symphony, as it provides no scope for the gradual development of a tune, or for variations on the same theme and so on, and thus surely fails to qualify as a miniature symphony. On the other hand, it is hard to think of a good reason why a one hour portion of a three day heat-wave, a portion throughout which the same temperature and humidity is maintained as throughout the entire duration, should not itself be regarded as an under-sized heat-wave. But complications set in when we consider, for instance, the case of “phantom Fred” (139-42) who out of the thin air sprung into a full sized man the moment he entered our home, and went out of existence two hours later as soon as we closed the door behind him. This case is different from that of the heat-wave since a genuine person, unlike our visitor, comprises of multiform temporal parts: a childhood, adolescence and so on. Yet it is also different from the case of the heavily curtailed musical performance, which when heard on its own generates none of the musical experiences associated with the works of the composer. Our visitor on the other hand, through his talk and mannerism, may provide during his two hour’s contact with us evidence, through which we can form an authentic impression of the important “memories” he carries in his head, of his temperament, character, ambitions and worries. Thus, he may make “full sense to us”, like any normal human being.

In Chapter 8 Brennan concedes the possibility of remote experiences, that is, of a person P feeling sensations in bodies other than his own. He then considers the situation in which all of P’s experiences become associated with an alien body—say the body of a mouse—while becoming at the same time dissociated with what used to be his body. Would it be correct to say that this human being has turned into, and continues to exist as a mouse? Brennan claim that it makes no sense of P becoming a mouse unless the two stages in P’s existence were causally connected: P’s present and past experiences and mental states have to have appropriate future successors in the states and experiences of the mouse, and its future states have to show appropriate causal relations to his previous states. (280-1 fn)

It seems to me that Brennan should have made greater allowance for the difference between the way others have to rely on a certain criterion to determine whether or not two manifestations are that of the same person or not, and between the way P himself makes judgments about his own identity. For example, if P had at this moment a headache and at the same time his ears were itching as well, he would, of course, be directly conscious that it is one and the same individual whose headache and whose itching he is experiencing. P requires no criterion at all to become aware of his self-identity. Thus, while the vital role causality plays in personal identity is convincingly depicted in the book, its function for me is confined

to the criterion I should use vis-à-vis others and not in connection with my own identity. The same goes for a human imprisoned in the body of a rodent.

Brennan has also interesting things to say about many other topics, e.g. about structure and part-whole relationships, the analogies between time and modality, the semantics of sortal terms, the difference between artifactual and natural kinds and the mind-body problem.

There are passages in the book that do not make for easy reading. This, however, is not due to the usage of unfamiliar formal techniques or an obscurity of style but to Brennan's persistence on scrupulously considering all the details and aspects of the ideas he regards relevant to his topic. I have little doubt that the reader will find himself well compensated for the effort required to work his way through some of the relatively more difficult parts of the book.

John Bigelow, *The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), viii + 193 pp., \$45.00 (cloth).

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The central thesis of *The Reality of Numbers* is that mathematics is the theory of universals. In particular, the natural numbers (which start at two!) are held to be certain *relations* that are instantiated by ordinary physical objects and by universals as well. The number three, for example, is the relation of "threefold mutual distinctness" that any three entities bear among themselves (52). Other numbers—integers (which include zero and one, but none of the other standard natural numbers!), rationals, reals, imaginaries, and complex numbers—are held by Bigelow to be relations that are instantiated by *relations* but *not* by ordinary physical things. He acknowledges that this makes them "fundamentally different from the natural numbers" (5). *Sets* are also held to be certain relations, ones that are in fact more akin to natural numbers than to the other numbers precisely because they are instantiated by ordinary things (as well as by universals). Bigelow holds that the main importance of sets in mathematics is that they provide instantiations of "all the structures which mathematicians have hitherto wanted to study" (6).

The book is divided into three parts, entitled "Metaphysics," "Mathematics," and "Truth and Existence." In the first part Bigelow motivates the view that mathematics is the theory of universals and